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15990
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Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
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Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
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15994
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If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
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Full Idea:
What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
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6866
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It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
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Full Idea:
For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
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From:
Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
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A reaction:
See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.
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4022
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Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
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Full Idea:
The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
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From:
report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
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A reaction:
This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).
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23365
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If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
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Full Idea:
When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
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From:
Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
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A reaction:
The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.
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6865
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A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
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Full Idea:
The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
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From:
Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
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A reaction:
The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?
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