|
8348
|
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
|
|
Full Idea:
The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
|
|
From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
|
|
A reaction:
He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.
|
|
15990
|
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
|
|
A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
|
|
16973
|
Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia]
|
|
Full Idea:
One view is that logical consequence is to be understood in terms of logical necessity (some proposition holds necessarily, if some group of other propositions holds). Alternatively, logical necessity is a logical consequence of the empty set.
|
|
From:
Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
I think my Finean preference is for all necessities to have a 'necessitator', so logical necessity results from logic in some way, perhaps from logical consequence, or from the essences of the connectives and operators.
|
|
15994
|
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
|
|
A reaction:
I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
|
|
10371
|
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
|
|
From:
report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
|
|
A reaction:
I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.
|
|
8346
|
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
|
|
Full Idea:
The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
|
|
From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
|
|
A reaction:
If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?
|