Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Universals' and 'Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
     Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1)
     A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13)
     A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other.
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8)
     A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12)
     A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
     Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
     Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber]
     Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2)
     A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance.