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All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'On Motion' and 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

5831	The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

5829	We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.

5830	The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
	A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5826	The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
	Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
	From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
	A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity

12709	Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.