9545
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Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara]
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Full Idea:
Near the end of his life, Frege completely abandoned his logicism, and came to the conclusion that the source of our arithmetical knowledge is what he called 'the Geometrical Source of Knowledge'.
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From:
report of Gottlob Frege (Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics [1922]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics Intro n3
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A reaction:
We have, rather crucially, lost touch with the geometrical origins of arithmetic (such as 'square' numbers), which is good news for the practice of mathematics, but probably a disaster for the philosophy of the subject.
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15990
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Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
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Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
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15994
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If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
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Full Idea:
What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
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12126
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People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
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A reaction:
I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
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12125
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Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
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A reaction:
This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
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12118
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Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
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A reaction:
I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
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