15990
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Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
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Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
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15994
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If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
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Full Idea:
What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
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6374
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To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
If we want an agent to believe as many truths as possible, this could be achieved by simply believing everything; if we want an agent to have only true beliefs, this could be achieved by believing nothing.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §6.6)
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A reaction:
I like this. It highlights the pragmatic need for a middle road, in which a core set of beliefs are going to be approved of as 'knowledge', so that we can get on with life. This has to be a social matter, and needs flexibility of Fallibilism.
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6373
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Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
Internalist theories make justifiability of a belief a function of the internal states of the believer, in the sense that if we vary anything but his internal states the justifiability of the belief does not vary.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §5.4.3)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a nice clear definition of internalism (and, by implication, externalism). It favours externalism. I know my car is in the car park; someone takes it for a joyride, then replaces it; my good justification seems thereby weakened.
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6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3)
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A reaction:
Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses.
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6357
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
Reasoning, it seems, can only justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.1)
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A reaction:
This sounds slick and conclusive, but it isn't. If we accept that some truths might be 'self-evident' to reason, they could stand independently. And a large body of rational beliefs might be mutually self-supporting, as in the coherence theory of truth.
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6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3)
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A reaction:
An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary.
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6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right).
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1)
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A reaction:
A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts.
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6358
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One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1)
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A reaction:
A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory.
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6352
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Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
Enumerative induction examines a sample of objects, observes they all have a property, and infers that they all have that property; statistical induction observes a proportion of the objects having the property, and infers that proportion in general.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.4.6)
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A reaction:
There is also induction by elimination, where it is either p or q, and observation keeps saying it isn't p. A small sample is very unreliable, but a huge sample (e.g. cigarettes and cancer) is almost certain, so where is the small/huge boundary?
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6360
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Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
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Full Idea:
The confirmation of scientific theories is probably best viewed in terms of inference to the best explanation.
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From:
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.3)
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A reaction:
A simple claim, but one with which I strongly agree. 'Inference', of course, implies that there is some fairly strict logical thinking going on, which may not be so. I suspect that dogs can move to the best explanation. It is, though, a rational process.
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20327
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Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
In modern discussions, rather than look for intrinsic properties of objects, including aesthetic or formal properties, attention has turned to extrinsic or relational properties, notably of a social, historical, or 'institutional' nature.
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
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A reaction:
Lots of modern branches of philosophy have made this move, which seems to me like a defeat. We want to know why things have the relations they do. Just mapping the relations is superficial Humeanism.
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20326
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Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
In the early twentieth century there were numerous attempts at defining the essence art. Significant form, intuition, the expression of emotion, organic unity, and other notions, were offered to this end.
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
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A reaction:
As far as I can see the whole of aesthetics was demolished in one blow by Marcel Duchamp's urinal. Artists announce: we will tell you what art is; you should just sit and listen. Compare the invention of an anarchic sport.
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20330
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The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
The dualistic view of the arts holds that works of art come in two fundamentally different kinds: those that are abstract entities, i.e. types, and those that are physical objects (tokens).
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 2)
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A reaction:
Paintings are the main reason for retaining physical objects. Strawson 1974 argues that paintings are only physical because we cannot yet perfectly reproduce them. I agree. Works of art are types, not tokens.
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