Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Psychophysical supervenience' and 'On Fate ('De fato')'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
21677 How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)
     A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15456 Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II
     A reaction: The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
     Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
     Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
21667 Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
     Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03)
     A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
21678 If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
     Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40)
     A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires.