5 ideas
19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
Full Idea: It is in the spirit of bivalence not just to treat each closed sentence as true or false; as Frege stressed, each general term must be definitely true or false of each object, specificiable or not. | |
From: Willard Quine (What Price Bivalence? [1981], p.36) | |
A reaction: But note that this is only the 'spirit' of the thing. If you had (as I do) doubts about whether predicates actually refer to genuine 'properties', you may want to stick to the whole sentence view, and not be so fine-grained. |
19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
Full Idea: A term is apt to be vague if it is to be learned by ostension, since its applicability must admit of being judged on the spot and so cannot hinge of fine distinctions laboriously drawn. | |
From: Willard Quine (What Price Bivalence? [1981], p.32) | |
A reaction: [Quine cites C. Wright for this] Presumably precision can steadily increased by repeated ostension. After the first 'dog' it's pretty vague; after hundreds of them we are pretty clear about it. Long observation of borderline 'clouds' could do the same. |
15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist. | |
From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species. |
15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge. | |
From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism | |
A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it. |
2594 | A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche] |
Full Idea: A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects. | |
From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Union of Body and Soul [1675], p.116) |