Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Summa quaestionum super Sententias' and 'The Poetics'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

16659	Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi]
	Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16673	Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi]
	Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
	A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

22518	The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Actual events are evidently possible, otherwise they would not have occurred.
	From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b18)
	A reaction: [quoted online by Peter Adamson] Seems like common sense, but it's important to have Aristotle assert it.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature

16566	Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.
	From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b05)
	A reaction: Hm. Characters in great novels achieve universality by being representated very particularly. Great depth of mind seems required to be a poet, but less so for a historian (though there is, I presume, no upward limit on the possible level of thought).

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

16663	Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi]
	Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
	A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example.