Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Hobbes' and 'Of Miracles'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
     Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
     Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
     Full Idea: The central question for sceptics is if we lose confidence in the truth of most existing beliefs, then how do we actually live?
     From: Richard Tuck (Hobbes [1989], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Scepticism is not, of course, all or nothing. You can lead a 'normal' life in a virtual reality machine. I find it much more of a struggle to live if I lose faith in values, than if I lose faith in tables.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume]
     Full Idea: In Hume's argument against miracles, how can it be more rational to believe the laws than the miracles, if the laws themselves are not based on reason?
     From: comment on David Hume (Of Miracles [1748]) by Atif Ishaq - talk
     A reaction: A very nice question. Hume never presents his argument with such an overt reliance on reason. But if the argument says you are in the 'habit' of expecting no anomalies in the laws, what is to prevent you changing the habit of a lifetime?