Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'What do powers do when they are not manifested?' and 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth

19323	'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
	Full Idea: The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'.
	From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7
	A reaction: This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour.

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth

19137	We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
	Full Idea: Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth.
	From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1
	A reaction: This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

17996	Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
	Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles.
	From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem'
	A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.