5784
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In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
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Full Idea:
We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
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A reaction:
I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
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5783
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Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
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A reaction:
An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
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18451
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The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20))
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A reaction:
There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted.
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5780
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The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
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Full Idea:
There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
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18453
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Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7))
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A reaction:
This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible.
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18463
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Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44)
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A reaction:
It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded?
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5778
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If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
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Full Idea:
If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
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A reaction:
Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
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16391
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Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
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Full Idea:
Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought.
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From:
report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1
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A reaction:
[There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'?
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5781
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Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
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5782
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A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
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A reaction:
This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
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18456
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Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5))
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A reaction:
Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it.
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18449
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Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2)
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A reaction:
Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree?
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18457
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Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39)
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A reaction:
This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism.
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