37 ideas
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Even a naturally gifted philosopher isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 485d) | |
| A reaction: A serious charge against philosophy. An attraction of the subject is its purity, its necessity, its timelessness, and in some ways these are just nicer and easier and more understandable than the hard mess of real life. But understanding has to be good. |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the 'Gorgias' Socrates is still supremely confident that the elenchus is the final arbiter of moral truth. | |
| From: comment on Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.117 |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Test me, and let yourself be tested as well, by asking and answering questions. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 462a) | |
| A reaction: The idea must be to avoid wild speculation, by continually filtering ideas through rival critical intelligences. The best philosophical method ever devised. |
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: A 'rebut' of an argument establishes that its conclusion is not the case. An 'undercut' of the argument shows that the premises do not support that conclusion. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.2) |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: The exceptional status of an object with respect to some default is more likely to spread to other objects if they share properties with that object that may play a role in explaining the exceptional status. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4) | |
| A reaction: This is an example of the sort of rational behaviour we exhibit, and which a 'real life' logic would somehow need to capture. I would suggest the essentialist logic designed by Kit Fine as a first port of call. |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: Most defeasible reasoning is externally dynamic, affected by the addition of further premises. But there is also an internal (or 'diachronic') dynamic, when further analysis reveals more about the given premises. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: There is much discussion of whether Floating Conclusions should be derived, given that they were derived from two arguments which conflict with one another. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.3) |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: In the Weakest Link Principle, an argument is preferred to another conflicting argument if its weakest defeasible link is stronger than the weakest defeasible link in the conflicting argument. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites John Pollock 1991] This sounds like the elementary principle applied when choosing a rope by which to hang a large weight above your head. It gets non-monotonic logic off the ground - if you know how to evaluate 'weakest'. |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: Conservative core of non-monotonic logic:Reflexivity (p proves p), Cut (if p proves q, it proves their joint implications), Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence (equivalences have same consequences), Right Weakening (non-m preserves classical). | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.1) | |
| A reaction: [Highly compressed, and without symbols] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: We can think of an 'ordinal ranking function' κ([φ)] as the level of surprise we would face were φ to hold, up to maximal surprise. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.2) | |
| A reaction: This suggests that Bayes's Theorem might be relevant to non-monotonic logic. This suggests that registering surprise would need to be an important feature of robot behaviour. |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: Test subjects seem to perform very poorly in various reasoning tests (Wason Selection, Suppression Task), suggesting logic has a subordinate role, but this may be using classical logic, where non-monotonic logics would be more appropriate. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4) | |
| A reaction: Fred Sommers presents his Term Logic (based on Aristotle) as closer to how people actually reason. It is certainly crazy to infer that most people's everyday reasoning is irrational. Induction is highly rational; it's just not deductive. |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: In classical logic, Monotony follows immediately from the nature of the relation |=, for Γ |= φ holds precisely when φ is true on every interpretation on which all sentences in Γ are true. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) | |
| A reaction: That is, semantic consequence (|=) is defined in terms of a sentence (φ) always being true if some other bunch of sentences (Γ) are true. Hence the addition of further sentences to Γ will make no difference - which is Monotony. |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| Full Idea: Basic Monotony: something stays proved if further premises are added. Cautious Monotony: the addition of something which has been proved makes no difference. Rational Monotony: it stays proved as long as the addition's negation hasn't been proved. | |
| From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) | |
| A reaction: [A compressed and non-symbolic summary] |
| 16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought. | |
| From: report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1 | |
| A reaction: [There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'? |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people about right and wrong. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 455a) | |
| A reaction: Surely there must be good rhetoric (or at least it is an open question)? |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is a knack, because it lacks rational understanding of its object or what it dispenses (and can't explain the reason anything happens). | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 465a) | |
| A reaction: If there are cunning people who have the wrong sort of intelligence for morality, there must be cunning users of rhetoric who know exactly what they are doing. |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: All activity aims at the good. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 499e) | |
| A reaction: He includes non-conscious activity, so this is the 'teleological' view of nature, which seems a bit optimistic to the modern mind. |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: It's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483b) | |
| A reaction: An aristocrat bemoans democracy. Presumably the qualification for being a 'weakling' is shortage of money. How strong are the scions of the aristocrats? |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c) | |
| A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time. |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e) | |
| A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires. |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When we drink to quench thirst, we lose the distress of the thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment, but one loss is good and the other bad, so the pleasure and the goodness must be separate. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 497d) | |
| A reaction: This is open to the objection that the good of slaking one's thirst is a long-term pleasure, where the drinking is short-term, so pleasure is still the good. |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Good should be the goal of pleasant activities, rather than pleasure being the goal of good activities. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 500a) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Not far off what Aristotle says on the topic. So what activities should we seek out? Narrow the pleasures down to the good ones, or narrow the good ones down to the pleasurable? |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There is little to tell between good and bad people (e.g. cowards) in terms of how much pleasure and distress they experience. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 498c) | |
| A reaction: A very perceptive remark. If the good are people with empathy for others, then they may suffer more distress than the insensitive wicked. |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: I want to ask whether a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 494c) | |
| A reaction: There are plenty of people who think 'fun' is the main aim of life, and who fit what Socrates is referring to. We don't admire such a life, but not many people can be admired. |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In a fool's mind desire is a leaky jar, …which is an analogy for the mind's insatiability, showing we should prefer an orderly life, in which one is content with whatever is to hand, to a self-indulgent life of insatiable desire. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 493b) | |
| A reaction: This points to an interesting paradox, that pleasure requires the misery of desire. And yet absence of desire is like death. An Aristotelian mean, of living according to nature, seems the escape route. |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: If a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there's no better or happier state of existence. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492c) |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: We should avoid doing wrong because of all the bad consequences it will bring us. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 480a) |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: If I had to choose between doing wrong and having wrong done to me, I'd prefer the latter to the former. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 469c) | |
| A reaction: cf Democritus 68B45 |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Self-indulgent desire makes a person incapable of co-operation, which is a prerequisite of friendship. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507e) |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: If people who need nothing are happy, there would be nothing happier than a stone or a corpse. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492e) | |
| A reaction: We aren't really supposed to approve of Callicles, but to me this is a splendidly crushing western response to many of the ideals found in eastern philosophy. |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: A criminal is worse off if he doesn't pay the penalty, and continues to do wrong without getting punished. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 472e) |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Why do most people praise self-discipline and justice? Because their own timidity makes them incapable of satisfying their pleasures. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492a) |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| Full Idea: I'm sure you know the list of human advantages in the party song: 'The very best is health, Second good looks, and third honest wealth'. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 451e) | |
| A reaction: This invites the obvious question of why anyone wants these three things, with the implied answer of 'pleasure'. But we might want them even if we couldn't use them, implying pluralism. |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| Full Idea: As in every case (an artefact, a body, a mind, a creature), a good state is an organised and orderly state. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 506e) |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The only responsibility of a good member of a community is altering the community's needs rather than going along with them. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 517b) |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c) |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: We only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a greater share than worse. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483d) |