16391
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Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
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Full Idea:
Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought.
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From:
report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1
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A reaction:
[There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'?
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8416
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Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
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Full Idea:
Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
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From:
Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
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A reaction:
I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.
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