19 ideas
| 23531 | Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher's task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all to enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. …The politician's eye does not see the possible, being attracted instead by the probable. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
| A reaction: An inspiring idea! He is rejecting Marx's aim of changing the world, which had 'catastrophic' results. But I love his view of interpretation as spotting tendencies and possibilities. This fits my preferred ontology of dispositions and powers. |
| 23538 | Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Consciousness is the only place where nothingness exists. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], II 'Expanding') | |
| A reaction: Not sure about this, but an interesting remark from someone with a Hegelian background. We certainly have a concept of nothingness (a mental file of it, even). |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change. |
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1) |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have. |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7) | |
| A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead. |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
| A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything? |
| 23532 | The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: A sense of guilt is linked to the delusion of free will. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
| A reaction: I agree that free will is a delusion, but I'm not sure about this. Clearly if you think you are 'ultimately' responsible for all of your actions this will increase guilt, but belief in free will is compatible with various excuses for actions. |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events. |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6) | |
| A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834. |
| 16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought. | |
| From: report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1 | |
| A reaction: [There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'? |
| 23537 | American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: American white men trusted the promises of neoliberal selfishness, they trusted the philosophy of winning, then discovered losing. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
| A reaction: The most pernicious terminology in the English-speaking world is the labelling of people as 'winners' and 'losers'. We celebrate the one winner, and ignore everyone else. Celebrity, excessive wealth, honourable titles. |
| 23536 | Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Community is only a nostalgic memory of a past condition of belonging that exists no longer. Regret, not a living experience. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this. Local heroes in my town make lovely efforts to improve the place (with flowers, sculptures) but most of us don't know who they are. Capitalist competition erodes community. |
| 23534 | Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Communist internationalism was the only attempt to reconcile the workers of the West and the oppressed population of the Global South, and this attempt failed. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
| A reaction: It was unfortunate that communism was launched in Russia, which we now see (in 2023) as poisoned by imperialist ambitions, and quite unsuited to international idealism. The Chinese are notably active in Africa. |
| 23533 | The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: The economy has progressively acquired the central place in the system of knowledge and research. Re-enacting the privilege of theocracy in the Middle Ages. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. This is indeed how the economy is treated, centring on Gross National Product (no matter how distributed), and economic league tables. Is it even a quasi-religion? |
| 23535 | Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Western workers are following nationalist agendas in order to avert the effects of globalization, and resorting to nationalist and racist forms of identification. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
| A reaction: By 'globalisation' must be meant the impersonal work and exploitation that results from huge ruthless anonymous companies. People barely know who they are working for, so it can't give them an identity. |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4) |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system). | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |