16 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model') | |
| A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement. |
| 23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The belief of the existence of anything seems to suppose a notion of existence - a notion too abstract, perhaps, to enter into the mind of an infant. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 05) | |
| A reaction: But even a small infant has to cope with the experience of waking up from a dream. I don't see how existence can be anything other than a primitive concept in any system of ontology. |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R') | |
| A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe. |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might') | |
| A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints. |
| 23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Self-evident propositions are those which appear evident to every man of sound understanding who apprehends the meaning of them distinctly, and attends to them without prejudice. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 10) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that there are some truths which are self-evident to dogs. There are also truths which are self-evident to experts, but not to ordinary persons of good understanding. Self-evidence is somewhat contextual. Self-evidence can be empirical. |
| 7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Sensation, by itself, implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object. ...Perception implies a conviction and belief of something external. ...Things so different in their nature ought to be distinguished. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], II.16), quoted by Barry Maund - Perception | |
| A reaction: Maund sees this as the origin of the two-stage view of perception, followed by Chisholm, Evans, Dretske and Lowe. It implies that 'looks', 'tastes', 'sounds' etc. are ambiguous words, having either phenomenal or realist meanings. I like it. |
| 23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The primary qualities are the object of the mathematical sciences. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 17) | |
| A reaction: He spells out this crucial point, which is not so obvious in Locke. The sciences totally rely on the primary qualities, so it is ridiculous to reject the distinction (which Reid accepts). |
| 23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The thought of a secondary quality always carries us back to the sensation which it produces.We give the same name to both, and are apt to confound them. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 17) | |
| A reaction: 'Redness', for example. Reid puts the point very nicely. Secondary qualities are not entirely mental; they pick out features of the world, but are much harder to understand than the primary qualities. The qualia question lurks. |
| 23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
| Full Idea: If it be made a question whether the toothache be in the mind that feels it, or in tooth that is affected, much might be said on both sides, while it is not observed that the word has two meanings. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 18) | |
| A reaction: I'm glad Reid was struck by the weird phenomenon of the brain apparently 'projecting' a pain into a tooth. Presumably before the brain's role was known, people were unaware of this puzzle. There certainly are not two distinct experiences. |
| 6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
| Full Idea: Reid is often represented by modern opponents of the empiricists as the outstanding protagonist of direct or naïve realism and common sense in the eighteenth century. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.6 | |
| A reaction: Robinson does not deny that this is Reid's view. Keith Lehrer is a great fan of Reid. Personally I think direct realism is quite clearly false, so I find myself losing interest in Reid's so-called 'common sense'. |
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| Full Idea: To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20) | |
| A reaction: It seems to be very common, though, for people to believe things on incredibly flimsy evidence, if they find the belief appealing. This is close to Clifford's Principle, but not quite as dogmatic. |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| Full Idea: If Nature gives us information of things that concern us, by other means that by reasoning, reason itself will direct us to receive that information with thankfulness, and to make the best use of it. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20) | |
| A reaction: This is more of a claim than an argument, but it is hard to see how anything could even be seen as evidence if some sort of rational judgement has not been made. The clever detective sees which facts are evidence. |
| 23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
| Full Idea: I think it requires some ripeness of understanding to distinguish the qualities of a body from the body; perhaps this distinction is not made by brutes, or by infants. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 19) | |
| A reaction: I'm glad the brutes get a mention in his assessment of these questions. I take such thinking to arise from what can be labelled the faculty of abstraction, which presumably only appears in a mature brain. It is second-level thinking. |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is') | |
| A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain. |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families]. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc') | |
| A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference. |
| 22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
| A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |