71 ideas
| 22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Constraints of rationality are built into the structure of mind and language, specifically into the structure of intentionality and speech acts. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Int xiv) |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If you think you need a rule to infer q from 'p and (if p then q)', then you would also need a rule to infer p from p. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| Full Idea: In real-life reasoning it is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactical rule. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| Full Idea: I am no fan of the concept of supervenience. Its uncritical use is a sign of philosophical confusion, because the concept oscillates between causal supervenience and constitutive supervenience. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.9 n5) | |
| A reaction: I don't see why you shouldn't assert the supervenience of one thing on another, while saying that you are not sure whether it is causal or constitutive. The confusion seems to me to be in understandings of the causal version. |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
| A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic. |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| Full Idea: A belief is a commitment to truth. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III) |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If I lie and say "It is raining", my utterance is intelligible to me as a lie precisely because I understand that the utterance commits me to the truth of a proposition I do not believe to be true. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.II) |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The terminology of "propositional attitudes" is confused, because it suggests that a belief is an attitude towards a propositions, …but the proposition is the content, not the object, of my belief. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.2) |
| 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
| A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct. |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| Full Idea: We should not say "It thinks" in preference to "I think". If thinking is an active, voluntary process, there must be a self who thinks. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) |
| 22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
| 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we? |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Both reasons and the things they are reasons for can be either facts in the world or intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
| A reaction: One might point out that beliefs, desires and intentions are facts in the world too. Implicit dualism. One can ask, what turns a fact into a reason? |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| Full Idea: For a long time people had a reason not to smoke cigarettes, without knowing that they had such a reason. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: What does 'had' a reason mean here? If I wish you dead, there is a reason why you should be dead, but you don't 'have' the reason, and never will have. There's probably a reason why I should never have been born. |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
| A reaction: This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason. |
| 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.23) | |
| A reaction: Not a point that would trouble an eliminativist, as it sounds suspiciously circular or question-begging. |
| 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.28) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I don't believe Roman legislators invented it, so where did it originate? Interesting that it is legalistic - a thing to which rights can accrue. Compare character, to which virtues accrue. |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| Full Idea: I am held responsible now for things that I did in the distant past. But that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
| A reaction: A possible response, of course, is that you are held responsible for your past deeds, but you shouldn't be. The idea that you are the same as when you committed the crime is a convenient fiction for people who desire revenge. Responsibility fades. |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The requirement that I state reasons that I acted on requires a reference to the self. …Only for a self can something be a reason for an action. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
| A reaction: Why can't we just say that this reason, given this desire and this belief, led to this action, and never mention the self? Admittedly leaving out 'I' is an odd circumlocution, but I don't find this particular argument very convincing. |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| Full Idea: In order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VIII) | |
| A reaction: I can't accept this all-or-nothing account. A chimpanzee is some sort of 'agent', and there are bad chimpanzees you wouldn't want in your colony. Why does Searle want to cut us off in some special compound where our actions are totally different? |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Selfhood in my sense comes for free once you have a conscious intentional being capable of engaging in free actions on the basis of reasons. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
| A reaction: The concept of an 'action' is probably the thing that most clearly needs a self, because it implies co-ordination and purpose, and there must be some item which benefits. Personally I think you can drop 'free actions' and still have a self. |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| Full Idea: It is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
| A reaction: I don't find this persuasive. I don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility of a set of desires and reasons within an organism which generate an action, without any intervening 'self' to add something. Ockham's Razor. |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| Full Idea: A self is conscious, persists through time, operates with reasons, carries out free actions, and is responsible. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.X) | |
| A reaction: Personally I would substitute 'makes decisions' for 'carries out free actions', but otherwise I agree, though he seems to miss a key aspect, which is that the self is in charge of the mind, and directs its focus and co-ordinates its inputs and outputs. |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a stipulative definition. It raises the question of whether it is possible that a lizard (say) is not actually conscious, but has some sort of propriotreptic awareness, and a 'central controller' for its decision-making. |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
| A reaction: A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others. |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Agency must be added to the bundle to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions, and selfhood must be added to account for how agents can act rationally. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
| A reaction: I don't buy much of this, but I am inclined to say that a will must be added to the bundle to explain why it acts consistently and coherently. It is certainly ridiculous to rest with the picture of a person as a completely unstructured bundle. |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The most dramatic manifestation of the free will gap is that when one has several reasons for performing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| Full Idea: In order to engage in rational decision making we have to presuppose free will. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Where free rational action is concerned, all effective reasons are made effective by the agent. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
| 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conditioning involves a change of behaviour, but not necessarily a change of mind. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to doubt this. If I was conditioned in some way, I would expect my conscious state to change as well as my behaviour. |
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |
| A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |
| A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
| 22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
| 22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
| Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| Full Idea: A well-ordered set of preferences is typically the result of successful deliberation, and is not its precondition. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If I desire to get rid of my flu symptoms, and believe the only way to do it is death, I am committed to desiring my death. …there is no plausible logic of practical reason. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.8.II) |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The single greatest difference between humans and other animals as far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognise and act on desire-independent reasons for action. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6 App) |
| 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The three forms of moral life (respect for persons, the pursuit of virtue and natural sympathy) all depend, in the last analysis, on piety, which is the deep-down recognition of our frailty and dependence. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.56) | |
| A reaction: MacIntyre agrees. 'Piety' is an odd word, which attempts to link the point to religious teachings. 'Dependence' seems an adequate term. But can fully independent creatures dispense with morality? I think not. |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| Full Idea: To say that something is true is already to say that you ought to believe it. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
| A reaction: I'm sure what Einstein said is true, but I don't understand it. The truth is the thought of how things actually are, but why should I not prefer my private fantasies? I see the point, though. |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| Full Idea: From the fact that an object is truly described as "a man", it follows that you ought to accept relevantly similar objects as men. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.IV) | |
| A reaction: 'Similar' rather begs the question. Common speech distinguishes sharply between a man and a 'real man'. You only accept them as men if you see them as men, not as similar to something else. Interesting. |
| 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30) | |
| A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders. |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution of promising, ..but from the fact that in promising I freely and voluntarily create a reason for myself. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.IV) |
| 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)? |
| 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61) | |
| A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality. |
| 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54) | |
| A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse). |
| 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86) | |
| A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed. |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| Full Idea: To say that someone 'ought' to do something is to imply that there is a reason for him to do it. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
| 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59) | |
| A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary. |
| 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63) | |
| A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content. |
| 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
| A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime. |
| 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
| A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences. |
| 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50) | |
| A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us. |
| 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: We don't give help to British animals (through the RSPCA) rather than foreign animals because of their nearness or needs, but because of our sense of them as fellow citizens. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.104) | |
| A reaction: A bit strong. It may, in fact, be because we look after them the way we look after the rest of our property. Even Kantians can be sentimental sometimes. |
| 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of intentionality introduces the first genuine claim of animals upon our sympathies and our moral concern. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
| A reaction: Good. If one's approach to morality is Humean (via sympathy) this seems right. Utilitarianism bases animal rights on qualia (pleasures and pains). |
| 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There is a difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats, and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
| A reaction: There are areas in the middle, where I encourage pheasants to breed 'wild' on my land. The purchase of a Rottweiller also tests the moral boundaries here. |
| 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Most of the stranger forms of life (worms, fleas, locusts etc.) are not really suitors for our moral concern, and interest us primarily as species, and only rarely as individuals. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.13) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, but that seems to reflect on us, rather than cutting nature at the joints. As soon as you look closely, you recognise an individual rather than a member of a species. |
| 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: An animal has acquired individuality if the gift of a proper name seems appropriate, the high point being reached with animals such as dogs which actually respond to their own name. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.39) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, even though it is rather chauvinistic. I might name the fleas in my circus, but regard a whole section of the human race as indistinguishable and not worth naming. |
| 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: I instinctively recoil from stepping on a spider or a forget-me-knot in my path, but neither of these responses expresses the fellow-feeling that forbids me to step on a rabbit or a mouse. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.41) | |
| A reaction: It is fellow-feeling that makes us prefer mammals to reptiles. It seems wrong to build a moral system purely on empathy, because psychopaths don't even empathise with nice human beings. Externalism in morality. |
| 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Lucky animals die in the jaws of a large predator; predators themselves are less lucky, when they die of lingering starvation; least fortunate are those killed by smaller creatures, such as maggots and bacteria. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.43) | |
| A reaction: A nice insight, even if it does slide into claiming that we are simply large predators, and that therefore fox-hunting is a virtue… |
| 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is easy to remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but the result is not a life which an animal should lead. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.44) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear where the "should" derives from here. You can't save them all, and large interventions would destroy the ecosystem. But should we never, say, put a victim out of its misery? |
| 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Sheep and beef cattle live a quiet and comfortable life among their companions, and are despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.81) | |
| A reaction: No rational person could envy a premature death, and we don't wait for cattle to be old before eating them. A quick death is little consolation for being murdered, and many people would prefer a slower death (without agony, of course). |
| 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Too much concern for individual animals may in fact harm the species, by promoting diseased or degenerate members, or preventing population control. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
| A reaction: Okay till we reach human beings, where this principle won't go away, even if further principles about personhood, rationality and deep sympathy enter the picture. We can't be utilitarian about animals, and something else about humans. |
| 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Animals exist outside the web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by dialogue, but because they have no rights it does not mean that we have no duties towards them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.97) | |
| A reaction: The modern Kantian view of animals, though Kant struggled to show why we might have any duties to animals. Is mere compassion enough to produce a duty, or is it a luxurious indulgence of our nature? |
| 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Dog-fights and bear-baiting are naturally forbidden by law, because they threaten the personality of those who attend them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.107) | |
| A reaction: Hm. If this is so, it is mainly because it takes place in a closed pen, where we can get a close look at the brutality and blood. It could be said to be more honest than hunting with gun or hounds. 'Go on eyes, look your worst'. |
| 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.75) | |
| A reaction: He is talking about race horses and St Bernards. This doesn't avoid the moral dilemma, because we could race horses die out if we thought we had created a bad life for them. |
| 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.91) | |
| A reaction: Good point. If we assume that culling is required at all, then the decisive human actions which shock us on television may be nicer than the natural deaths that occur during the night. |