58 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
Full Idea: An ancient Greek would have said that being wise is an ethical value. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This is instantly appealing, but since the Enlightenment we are under an obligation to attempt to justify absolutely everything, including the value of wisdom. I'm thinking that it only has value if it leads to eudaimonia. |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
Full Idea: The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
Full Idea: Constraints of rationality are built into the structure of mind and language, specifically into the structure of intentionality and speech acts. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Int xiv) |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Putnam replaces a correspondence theory of truth with an epistemic notion of truth - truth is idealized rational acceptability. The correspondence theory is committed to realism, but his allows ontological relativism. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be part of a slide by Putnam away from realism towards pragmatism. As a robust and defiant realist, this always strikes me as the road to hell. |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Before Kant it is impossible to find any philosopher who did not have a correspondence theory of truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't believe this is true of Descartes. See ideas 2266 and 4298. Truth is 'clear and distinct' conceptions, but if you enlarge (and maybe socialise) 'clear' you get coherent. Descartes firmly avoids correspondence, because he can't trust 'facts'. |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Putnam argues that theory does not correspond to reality, because there are myriad correspondences possible, and we cannot single out "the" relation of correspondence. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This obviously depends on views about reference and meaning. I don't see the problem in simple cases, which is all the correspondence theory needs. Complex cases, like chemistry, may well have ambiguities, but so what? |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability; we speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions, and we call a statement 'true' if it would be justified under such conditions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The second part makes human beings sound stupid (which they are not), but the first part is right, and incredibly important. Peirce is behind Putnam's thought. Truth is the target of belief. It isn't a nonsense just because we can't be infallible. |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
Full Idea: If you think you need a rule to infer q from 'p and (if p then q)', then you would also need a rule to infer p from p. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
Full Idea: In real-life reasoning it is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactical rule. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Intension cannot be identified with meaning. ..'Cube' and 'regular polyhedron with six square faces' are logically equivalent predicates. The intension is the same (the function giving the cubes in any possible world) but there is a difference of meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If the number of cats happens to equal the cherries, then it follows from the theory of models that there is a reinterpretation of the entire language that leaves all sentences unchanged in truth value while permuting the extensions of 'cat' and 'cherry'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This horrifying result seems to come simply from the fact that there is an isomorphism between two models, which in turn seems to rest largely on the cardinality of the models. There seems to be something wrong with model theory here (?). |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am no fan of the concept of supervenience. Its uncritical use is a sign of philosophical confusion, because the concept oscillates between causal supervenience and constitutive supervenience. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.9 n5) | |
A reaction: I don't see why you shouldn't assert the supervenience of one thing on another, while saying that you are not sure whether it is causal or constitutive. The confusion seems to me to be in understandings of the causal version. |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: If we try to base determinate reference on natural causal connection, Putnam says this is just more theory, as subject as any theory to overabundant, conflicting intended interpretations. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by David Lewis - Putnam's Paradox 'Why Are' | |
A reaction: This is the 1981 Putnam, moving away from the realism that was implicit in the original causal theory of reference developed by himself and Kripke. His 'just more theory' is the slogan of Putnam's later anti-realism. |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' can be reinterpreted so that in the actual world 'cat' refers to cherries and 'mat' refers to trees, without affecting the truth-value of the sentence in any possible world. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This simple suggestion is the basis of a notorious argument in favour of anti-realism. See D.Lewis's 'Putnam's Paradox'. It tracks back to Skolem's doubts about whether infinitary mathematics is possible. Putnam's conclusion sounds daft. |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I propose that the only criterion for what is a fact is what it is rational to accept. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Pref) | |
A reaction: An epistemological-ontological confusion here. The concept of a fact is of something which is the case quite independently of our criteria for believing it. There are facts which are unknowable for humans. It is, of course, rational to accept facts. |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers are so nominalistic that they would deny the existence of such entities as 'properties' altogether; but science itself does not hesitate to talk freely of properties. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Maybe scientists aren't very good at ontology? They talk about forces and energy, but don't seem to know what they are. I am inclined to think that we must include properties in the working ontology of humans, but not into strict physics. |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Putnam endorses the view that necessity is relative to a description, so there is only necessity 'de dicto': relative to language, not to reality. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Even a realist must take this proposal seriously. The facts may contain de re necessities, but we could be very sceptical about our capacity to know them. Personally I enjoy speculating about de re necessities. They can't stop you. |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: A belief is a commitment to truth. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III) |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I lie and say "It is raining", my utterance is intelligible to me as a lie precisely because I understand that the utterance commits me to the truth of a proposition I do not believe to be true. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.II) |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
Full Idea: The terminology of "propositional attitudes" is confused, because it suggests that a belief is an attitude towards a propositions, …but the proposition is the content, not the object, of my belief. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.2) |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
Full Idea: We should not say "It thinks" in preference to "I think". If thinking is an active, voluntary process, there must be a self who thinks. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
Full Idea: Both reasons and the things they are reasons for can be either facts in the world or intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: One might point out that beliefs, desires and intentions are facts in the world too. Implicit dualism. One can ask, what turns a fact into a reason? |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
Full Idea: For a long time people had a reason not to smoke cigarettes, without knowing that they had such a reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: What does 'had' a reason mean here? If I wish you dead, there is a reason why you should be dead, but you don't 'have' the reason, and never will have. There's probably a reason why I should never have been born. |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
Full Idea: Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I) | |
A reaction: This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason. |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What the relativist fails to see is that it is a presupposition of thought itself that some kind of objective 'rightness' exists. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This may be the key objection to relativism. If you have a frame of reference, is it a good one? If you have a new perspective, is it better than your old one? Is the culture you live in confused or clear-thinking? Jokes and metaphors rely on truth. |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
Full Idea: On a naïve operationalist account every time a new way of testing whether a substance is really gold is discovered, the meaning and reference of 'gold' undergoes a change. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am held responsible now for things that I did in the distant past. But that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: A possible response, of course, is that you are held responsible for your past deeds, but you shouldn't be. The idea that you are the same as when you committed the crime is a convenient fiction for people who desire revenge. Responsibility fades. |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: The requirement that I state reasons that I acted on requires a reference to the self. …Only for a self can something be a reason for an action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: Why can't we just say that this reason, given this desire and this belief, led to this action, and never mention the self? Admittedly leaving out 'I' is an odd circumlocution, but I don't find this particular argument very convincing. |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VIII) | |
A reaction: I can't accept this all-or-nothing account. A chimpanzee is some sort of 'agent', and there are bad chimpanzees you wouldn't want in your colony. Why does Searle want to cut us off in some special compound where our actions are totally different? |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
Full Idea: Selfhood in my sense comes for free once you have a conscious intentional being capable of engaging in free actions on the basis of reasons. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: The concept of an 'action' is probably the thing that most clearly needs a self, because it implies co-ordination and purpose, and there must be some item which benefits. Personally I think you can drop 'free actions' and still have a self. |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
Full Idea: It is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: I don't find this persuasive. I don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility of a set of desires and reasons within an organism which generate an action, without any intervening 'self' to add something. Ockham's Razor. |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
Full Idea: A self is conscious, persists through time, operates with reasons, carries out free actions, and is responsible. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.X) | |
A reaction: Personally I would substitute 'makes decisions' for 'carries out free actions', but otherwise I agree, though he seems to miss a key aspect, which is that the self is in charge of the mind, and directs its focus and co-ordinates its inputs and outputs. |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
Full Idea: The first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a stipulative definition. It raises the question of whether it is possible that a lizard (say) is not actually conscious, but has some sort of propriotreptic awareness, and a 'central controller' for its decision-making. |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
Full Idea: The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX) | |
A reaction: A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others. |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
Full Idea: Agency must be added to the bundle to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions, and selfhood must be added to account for how agents can act rationally. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) | |
A reaction: I don't buy much of this, but I am inclined to say that a will must be added to the bundle to explain why it acts consistently and coherently. It is certainly ridiculous to rest with the picture of a person as a completely unstructured bundle. |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The most dramatic manifestation of the free will gap is that when one has several reasons for performing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
Full Idea: In order to engage in rational decision making we have to presuppose free will. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
Full Idea: Where free rational action is concerned, all effective reasons are made effective by the agent. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.II) |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Our notion of rationality is, at bottom, just one part of our conception of human flourishing, our idea of the good. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Pref) | |
A reaction: This looks like the beginnings of virtue epistemology, since rationality will have criteria, which would seem to be virtues. I find this idea appealing, both as a view of rationality, and as a view of the human good. |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The word 'water' used on Twin Earth refers not to water but to this other liquid (XYZ). Yet there is no relevant difference in the mental state of Twin Earth speakers and speakers on Earth (in 1750) to account for this difference of reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: In this world, if you and I separately meet twins, and I think about this twin while you think about that one, our mental states are different even if they are indistinguishable. I know I'm thinking about my twin, not yours. Indexicals. |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
Full Idea: My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess), which shows that the determination of reference is social and not individual - both you and I defer to experts who can tell elms from beeches. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: If I said 'that tree looks nice' I wouldn't be deferring to experts. Nor if I said 'that tree, which I take to be an elm, looks nice'. If I am an expert I don't defer to experts. |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be building on the idea that meaning is use, and also arises from a background of pragmatism. Perhaps a concept is an acquaintance with a node in platonic space? Lots of abilities aren't concepts, so what distinguishes the concepts? |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Mental state (in either the individualistic or the collective sense) does not fix reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The idea that communities fix reference seems to me plausible. See Tyler Burge on this. |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
Full Idea: One might concede that the reference of a person's term isn't fixed by his individual mental state, but insist that the total mental state of all the members of the language community fixes the reference of the term. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I like this reading of the problem, though Putnam himself prefers to say that things fix the reference. I take reference to be a human action, not a natural causal relation. Animals connecting thought to object may not count as reference at all. |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: There are always infinitely many different interpretations of the predicates of a language which assign 'correct' truth-values to the sentences in all possible worlds, no matter how those 'correct' truth-values are singled out. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Putnam says that he is using this argument from model theory to endorse the scepticism about 'gavagai' that Quine expressed in 1960. It is based on the ideas of Skolem, who was a renegade philosopher of mathematics. See Tim Button. |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
Full Idea: A well-ordered set of preferences is typically the result of successful deliberation, and is not its precondition. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I desire to get rid of my flu symptoms, and believe the only way to do it is death, I am committed to desiring my death. …there is no plausible logic of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.8.II) |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The single greatest difference between humans and other animals as far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognise and act on desire-independent reasons for action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
Full Idea: Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6 App) |
15677 | Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: According to discourse ethics moral rightness is internally linked to validity and is analogous to truth: ..thus Habermas takes himself to have shown that morality is a matter of knowledge, rather than the expression of contingently held values. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action [1990]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.7:102 | |
A reaction: I can immediately hear Nietzsche asking why you place such a high value on knowledge. Personally I don't assume that values must be 'contingent'. The Aristotelian tradition sees necessary values in facts about human nature. |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The use of the word 'inconsiderate' seems to me a very fine example of the way in which the fact/value distinction is hopelessly fuzzy in the real world and in the real language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but not much of an argument. What would Nietzsche say? Was Agamemnon morally deficient because we might think him 'inconsiderate'? |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that something is true is already to say that you ought to believe it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.II) | |
A reaction: I'm sure what Einstein said is true, but I don't understand it. The truth is the thought of how things actually are, but why should I not prefer my private fantasies? I see the point, though. |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
Full Idea: From the fact that an object is truly described as "a man", it follows that you ought to accept relevantly similar objects as men. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.5.IV) | |
A reaction: 'Similar' rather begs the question. Common speech distinguishes sharply between a man and a 'real man'. You only accept them as men if you see them as men, not as similar to something else. Interesting. |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
Full Idea: The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution of promising, ..but from the fact that in promising I freely and voluntarily create a reason for myself. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.IV) |
15671 | Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas] |
Full Idea: The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm. | |
From: Jürgen Habermas (Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action [1990], p.67), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.5:69 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being very close to Scanlon's contractualism. As expressed here, it sounds more vulnerable than Kant's full universality to the problem of Nazis agreeing odious universal norms. Habermas calls it 'discourse ethics'. |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
Full Idea: To say that someone 'ought' to do something is to imply that there is a reason for him to do it. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |