18967
|
A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
|
|
A reaction:
Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.
|
18968
|
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
|
|
A reaction:
If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.
|
7076
|
Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not.
|
|
From:
report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3
|
|
A reaction:
The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452).
|