40 ideas
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed. |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We boast of our mighty reason above other animals, but its processes are too slow, too full of doubt, to serve us in every exigency, either for our preservation, without external senses, or to influence our actions for good without the moral sense. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.III) | |
A reaction: This idea was taken up by Hume, and it must have influence Hume's general scepticism about the importance of reason. What this idea misses is the enormous influence of prior reasoning on our quick decisions. |
7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
Full Idea: The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This principle (based on knowing your own dispositions) is a very good account of the ethics drunkenness. We have a moral duty to know and remember our own dispositions. Violent people should avoid arguments as well as alcohol. |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: By a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we approve the actions of others. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], Intro) | |
A reaction: This tries to present moral insight as being on a par with the famous five senses. This doesn't seem quite right to me; separate parts of me can operate individual senses, but the whole of me is required for moral judgements, based on evidence. |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Let us consider if a traitor, who would sell his own country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as an hero who defends us: and yet we can love the treason, and hate the traitor. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VI) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which certainly refutes any claim that morality is entirely and directly self-interested. High-minded idealism, though, is not the only alternative explanation. We admire loyalty, but not loyalty to, say, Hitler. |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: The moral sense is not an innate idea or knowledge, but a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VIII) | |
A reaction: This may claim a pure moral intuition, but it is also close to Kantian universalising of the rules for behaviour. It is also a variation on Descartes' 'natural light' of reason. Of course, if we say the ideas are 'received', where are they received from? |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition; if they could, then we could be bribed into any affection whatsoever toward any object. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.IV) | |
A reaction: Of course, notoriously, the vast mass of people have often been bribed to love a politician, by low taxes, or bread and circuses. Still, you cannot choose to love or admire someone, you just do. Not much free will there. |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Every mortal is made uneasy by any grievous misery he sees another involved in, unless the person be imagined morally evil. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §V.VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the natural compassion on which Hume built his moral theory. This remark emphasises that a concern for justice is just as important as a compassion for pain. Kant was more interested in what we deserve than in what we get. |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Human nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or an ultimate desire of the misery of others, when we imagine them not pernicious to us, or opposite to our interests; ..that is only the effect of self-love, not disinterested malice. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.VII) | |
A reaction: I suppose it is true that even the worst criminals brooding in prison don't wish the entire population of some foreign country to die in pain. Only a very freakish person would wish the human race were extinct. A very nice observation. |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: How comes it that we do not lose, at the approach of death, all concern for our families, friends, or country? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.V) | |
A reaction: A nice question. No doubt some people do cease to care, but on the whole it raises the 'last round' problem in social contract theory, which is why fulfil your part of a bargain if it is too late to receive the repayment afterwards? |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: No good effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my action morally good. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.XII) | |
A reaction: This is one of the parents of utilitarianism repudiating pure consequentialism. Bentham sharply divided the action (which is consequentialist) from the person (who has useful intentions, but is not particulary important); this division is misleading. |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Mere courage, or contempt of danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the defence of the innocent, or repairing of wrongs or self-interest, would only entitle its possessor to bedlam. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.I) | |
A reaction: If many criminals would love to rob a bank, but only a few have the nerve to attempt it, we can hardly deny that the latter exhibit a sort of courage. The Greeks say that good sense must be involved, but few of them were so moral about courage. |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.VIII) | |
A reaction: The first use of a phrase taken up by Bentham. This is not just an anticipation of utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism, with all its commitment to consequentialism (but see Idea 6246), and to the maximising of happiness. It is a brilliant idea. |
7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
Full Idea: I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Mill, writing in praise of personal liberty, is desperate to introduce a paternalistic element into his politics, and the 'maximisation of happiness' will justify such paternalism, while his basic liberal principle (Idea 7211) won't. Mill's Dilemma. |
7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
Full Idea: Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: If I should not even think about evil deeds, then neither should you. I would prevent you if I could. I would prevent you from drinking yourself to death, if I could. It is just that intrusions into private lives leads to greater trouble. |
7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
Full Idea: The will of the people practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Hence the nicely coined modern phrase 'the silent majority', on whose behalf certain politicians, usually conservative, offer to speak. It is unlikely that the silent majority are actually deeply opposed to the views of the very active part. |
7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
Full Idea: Government interference should be restricted because of the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This would need justification, because it might be replied that individuals should not have unnecessary power either. The main problem is that governments have armies, police and money. |
7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
Full Idea: Government power should be restricted because things are often done better by individuals. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This contains some truth, but it is obvious that innumerable things can be done better by governments, and also (and more importantly) that innumerable other good things might be done by governments which individuals can't be bothered to do. |
7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
Full Idea: The safest practical ideal is to aim for the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice principle, which I would think desirable within an institution as well as on the scale of the state. I am becoming a fan of Mill's politics. I still say that freedom is an overrated virtue, so efficiency must be underrated. |
20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: For Mill the greatest happiness will be achieved by giving people a private sphere of interests where no intervention is permitted, while allowing a public sphere where intervention is possible, but only on utilitarian grounds. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Liberty' | |
A reaction: This is probably standard liberal practice nowadays. Freely consenting adult sexual activity is agreed to be wholly private. At least some lip-service is paid to increasing happiness when government intervenes. |
7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
Full Idea: A people accustomed to transacting their own business is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: He makes reference to Americans. This is an important idea, because it shows that democratic control is not just a matter of elections (which can be abolished or suborned), but is also a characteristic of a certain way of life. |
7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
Full Idea: The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others; his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea in Mill's liberalism, though he goes on to offer some qualifications of this absolute prohibition. I don't disagree with this principle, but there may be a lot more indirect harm than we realise (eg. in allowing liberal sex or drugs). |
7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
Full Idea: The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, opposed to any idea that we should abandon our own value to that of our state. I agree, but communitarians can subscribe to this too, while disagreeing that maximum freedom is the strategy to follow. |
7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
Full Idea: The strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is also a well known objection to capital punishment. Generalised, well established, legal interferences are perhaps more likely to get it right than ad hoc decisions about individuals by individual officials. |
7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
Full Idea: Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There is a Victorian (and Enlightenment) optimism here which a glimpse of the freedoms of the early twenty-first century might dampen. I doubt if Mill expected British tabloid newspapers, or porn on cable TV. Education and freedom connect. |
20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill has presented liberty as instrumentally valuable, as a way of achieving the greatest possible happiness in society. But perhaps he should have argued that liberty is an intrinsic good, good in itself. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic' | |
A reaction: If freedom is intrinsically good, does this leave us (as Wolff warned earlier) unable to defend its value? Freedom isn't an intrinsic good for infants, so why should it be so for adults? Good because it brings happiness, or fulfils our nature? |
20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism provides an account of what liberties we should and should not have. Mill argues we should be free to compete in trade, but not to use another's property without consent. Thus he sets limits to liberty, while paying it great respect. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic' |
7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
Full Idea: The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This principle will probably lead up a Prisoner's Dilemma cul-de-sac. The only freedom which deserves the name is the collective agreed freedom of a whole community to live well, when citizens volunteer to restrict their individual freedoms. |
7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
Full Idea: All restraint, qua restraint, is an evil. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The ultimate justification for this is (presumably) utilitarian, but that would mean that there was nothing wrong with restraint if the person did not mind, or was not aware of the restraint. What is intrinsically wrong with restraint? |
7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
Full Idea: My first maxim is that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, and one which communitarians have doubts about (because it is almost impossible to perform an action which is of no interest, in the short or long term, to others). I share these doubts. |
7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
Full Idea: An official could turn a person back from an unsafe bridge without infringeing their liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Seems fair enough, but it justifies paternalist interference. The tricky one is where the official and the citizen disagree over what the citizen 'truly' desires. Asking people may involve too much time, but it could also involve too much effort. |
7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
Full Idea: A person being free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house, lies on the exact boundary line between two principles, of toleration and of restraint. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Nothing illuminates a philosopher's principles more than for them to specify cases that lie on their borderlines. Both professions seem, unfortunately, to lead people into worse activities, such as violent bullying, or theft. Tricky.. |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Perfect rights are necessary to the public good, and it makes those miserable whose rights are thus violated; …imperfect rights tend to the improvement and increase of good in a society, but are not necessary to prevent universal misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.VI) | |
A reaction: This is a very utilitarian streak in Hutcheson, converting natural law into its tangible outcome in actual happiness or misery. The distinction here is interesting (taken up by Mill), but there is a very blurred borderline. |
7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
Full Idea: My second maxim is that for actions that are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and subject to social or legal punishment, if society believes that this is requisite for its protection. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: (wording compressed). The trouble with this would seem to be the possible disagreement between the individual and the society over whether the actions actually are prejudicial to others. It would justify a conservative society in being repressive. |
7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
Full Idea: It is often desirable that beneficial things should be done by individuals, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This raises the important danger, which even those on the political left must acknowledge, of the 'nanny state'. It offers a nicely paternalistic, and even patronising reason for giving people freedom, just as a parent might to a child. |
7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
Full Idea: Individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves diversity of education; a general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being particularly true with the advent in Britain of the National Curriculum in the early 1990s. However, if there is a pressure towards conformity in state education, private education is dominated by class and money. |
7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
Full Idea: To bestow a life on someone which may be either a curse or a blessing, unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is the standard utilitarian attitude to engendering people. I think I have to agree. It is no argument against this to say that we value people with poor life prospects, once they have arrived. Altruism towards children may disguise selfish parents. |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We call the Deity morally good, when we apprehend that his whole providence tends to the universal happiness of his creatures. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: From the point of view of eternity, we might accept that God aims at some even greater good than the happiness of a bunch of miserable little creatures whose bad behaviour merits little reward. The greater good needs to be impressive, though. |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: To call the laws of the supreme Deity good or holy or just, if these be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than 'God wills what he wills' or 'His will is conformable to his will'. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: This argues not only against God as the source of morality, but also against any rules, such as those of the Categorical Imperative. Why should I follow the Categorical Imperative? What has value must dictate the rules. Is obedience the highest value? |
7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |
Full Idea: To extract from the Gospel a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible withouth eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: 'Barbarous' has a quaint Victorian ring to it, but his point is that the surviving teachings of Jesus are very thin and generalised. Christians would do better to expand their implications, than to borrow from the Old Testament. |