11 ideas
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
Full Idea: The differences between Aristotelian essentialism and Kripke's essentialism are so fundamental and pervasive that it is a serious distortion of both views to think of essentialism as a single theory. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be very important, because there is a glib assumption that when essentialism is needed for modal logic, that we must immediately have embraced what Aristotle was saying. Aristotle was better than Kripke. |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
Full Idea: An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences. |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
Full Idea: By holding that the most unified beings have essences in an unqualified sense, while allowing that other beings have them in a qualified sense - we can think of unity as a matter of degree. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is Witt's somewhat unorthodox view of how we should read Aristotle. I am sympathetic, if essences are really explanatory. That means they are unstable, and would indeed be likely to come in degrees. |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
Full Idea: The central function of essence is to explain the actual existence of a unified substance. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 5 n1) | |
A reaction: She is offering an interpretation of Aristotle. Since existence is an active and not a passive matter, the identity of the entity will include its dispositions etc., I presume. |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
Full Idea: The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Nevertheless, Aristotle believes in individual essences, though these seem to be fixed by definitions, which are composed of combinations of universals. The uniqueness is of the whole definition, not of its parts. |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it? |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion. |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2 | |
A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants. |
7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not. | |
From: report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3 | |
A reaction: The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452). |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232) | |
A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically. |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
Full Idea: Reality is directional. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [Plucked from context! She attributes the view to Aristotle] This slogan beautifully summarises the 'scientific essentialist' view of reality, based not on so-called 'laws', but on the active powers of the stuffs of reality. |