22 ideas
5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
Full Idea: The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of simplistic psychology that modern philosophers tend to avoid. Personally I am more Kantian. I will and desire that the answer to 3+2=? is 5, simply because it is true. Mill must realise we can will ourselves to desire something. |
3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
Full Idea: There is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of early sanctions and influence, be made to act on the human mind with all the influence of conscience. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Like this! Think of all the people who have had weird upbringings, and end up feeling guilty about absurd things. Conscience just summarise upbringing and social conventions. |
3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
Full Idea: The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is an error to try to separate these too sharply. Morality can't be purely consequential, because it would make earthquakes immoral. Actions indicate the worth of agents. |
3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
Full Idea: Utilitarians believe that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) |
3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
Full Idea: The customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.3) |
7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
Full Idea: One continues to believe in good and evil: in such a way that one feels the victory of good and the annihilation of evil to be a task (- this is English; a typical case is that shallow-headed John Stuart Mill). | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 11[148]e | |
A reaction: The poor old English try very hard to be clear, sensible, practical and realistic, and get branded as 'shallow' for their pains. Nietzsche was a deeper thinker than Mill, but I would prefer Mill to Heidegger any day. |
5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
Full Idea: Mill's introduction of quality of pleasures into the hedonistic calculus is an unconscious departure from hedonism and a half-hearted admission that there are other qualities than pleasantness in virtue of which states of mind are good. | |
From: comment on John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
A reaction: Mill argues that experienced people prefer some pleasures to others, but ducks the question of why they might prefer them. It can only be because they have some further desirable quality on top of the equal amount of pleasure. |
3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
Full Idea: The Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
Full Idea: The Greatest Happiness Principle is a mere form of empty words unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree, is counted for exactly as much as another's (Bentham's "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one"). | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
Full Idea: Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
Full Idea: What can be proved good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. Music is good because it produces pleasure, but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.1) |
3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
Full Idea: Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.2) |
3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
Full Idea: No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.4) |
6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
Full Idea: Moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another are more vital to human well-being than any maxims about some department of human affairs; ..though in particular cases a social duty is so important, as to overrule any general maxim of justice. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.7 | |
A reaction: The qualification is realistic, but raises the question of whether an 'act' calculation will always overrule any 'rule'. Maybe rule utilitirianism is just act utilitarianism, but ensuring that the calculations are long-term and extensive. (1871 edn) |
3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
Full Idea: Wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of benevolence. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
Full Idea: No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |
Full Idea: When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism [1861], Ch.5) |
21798 | To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel] |
Full Idea: If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would have anything to give. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 152), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Faith' | |
A reaction: Matthew 5:8, 19:21. Beautifully clear. [I always believed that I had thought of this idea - but not so]. If the logic is that it is better to be poor than to be rich, then the implication is that all excess wealth should be thrown into the sea. |
21797 | Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. ...As pure knowing or as thinking, Spirit has the universal for its object - this is eternity. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 208), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Death' | |
A reaction: An unusual view of immortality, which challenges orthodoxy. The idea seems to be that 'pure knowing' is a grasping of the pure reason which embodies nature, which in turn is the nature of God. You enter eternity, rather than reside in it? |
5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |