Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Intuitionism: an Introduction' and 'Letter on Freedom'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
5042 For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112)
     A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
8754 Logic is dependent on mathematics, not the other way round [Heyting, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Heyting (the intuitionist pupil of Brouwer) said that 'logic is dependent on mathematics', not the other way round.
     From: report of Arend Heyting (Intuitionism: an Introduction [1956]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 7.3
     A reaction: To me, this claim makes logicism sound much more plausible, as I don't see how mathematics could get beyond basic counting without a capacity for logical thought. Logic runs much deeper, psychologically and metaphysically.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).