8978
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Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
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A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
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8989
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The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
While the goods of freedom, such as rights, property, education and prosperity, can be obtained only at a price - the price of loneliness, doubt and alienation - it is a price worth paying.
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From:
Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993])
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A reaction:
A striking way for a liberal-conservative to confront the accusations of the marxists - by conceding a lot of their criticisms, but living with them. I still don't see why we shouldn't aspire to have both.
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8990
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So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
The promise of 'liberation' has always been the enemy of freedom - in 1968 as much as in 1789 and 1917. Its first desire, and its only policy, is to destroy the institutions and traditions (the 'structures') which make freedom durable.
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From:
Roger Scruton (Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture [1993], p.9)
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A reaction:
There is a dilemma, though, if your legal system is corrupt. Far too many political attitudes are formed because of high-profile spectacular cases, instead of looking at daily routines. The latter might make a corrupt legal system still worth saving.
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10364
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Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
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A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
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