15 ideas
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
| A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
| 23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: More localised politics helps to generate the disposition of care for the land which is a core feature of environmental politics. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 4) | |
| A reaction: I currently live in a time when localised politics is hugely devalued, because centralisation and privatisation are cheaper. It seems obvious that many human needs require a commitment to a particular locality. |
| 23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: An ideology generally has three components: a judgement (usually critical) of how things are, a picture of the ideology's ideal society, and a strategy for progressing towards the ideal. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Conservatives tend to think we are already living in the ideal, and they reject most ideologies for being 'idealistic' (which presumably means delusional). I'm a fan of ideals, but combined with cool judgement. |
| 23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Liberals say that their preferences are their interests, and resist the idea that anyone could know their interests better than they can. …To this degree, ecologism might be regarded as 'non-liberal'. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: There are lots of other cases where liberal citizens may not realise their best interests, such as in the control of traffic, or of drugs. |
| 23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Marx and his heirs promote a productivist socialism, but utopian socialists such as William Morris offer a less productivist and more decentralised form of socialism. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Modern history teaches us to be very cautious about the centralised version. Presumably you could be decentralised but still value production highly, even if it is a bit less efficient. |
| 23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Difference feminists argue that men and women are fundamentally different. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: You can be significantly different without being 'fundamentally' different. Personally I don't see a huge difference, even though history may have greatly exaggerated and dramatised what differences there are. |
| 23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Although bare population figures are important for environmental impact, the level of affluence and the technology are also crucial factors. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: It is worth noting that the technology can also have a good impact, though affluence is nearly always bad. |
| 23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: A central belief of the ideology of ecologism is that aggregate growth must be reduced, and that this is very unlikely to be achieved by efficiency gains alone. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: He argues that efficiency gains invariably lead to increased production. Trickle down economics needs huge growth to deliver a good life for the poorest sector. Ecologism has to be fairly egalitarian about wealth. |
| 23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: We must acknowledge that a million years is a proper unit of political time. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Colin Tudge] Such thinking is almost impossible, but owners of large aristocratic estates seem to have thought in centuries, because they were confident of continuity. The more we identify with all of humanity, the more this is possible. |
| 23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: At current rates we seem to value present concerns as fourteen times more valuable than future concerns. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: A sobering figure, which sounds about right. This directly influences how much we spend on future concerns. One thought is that future generations may be much more affluent than us! |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |