Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs' and 'Elements of Intuitionism (2nd ed)'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic

18832	Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett]
	Full Idea: On an intuitionistic view, neither the truth-value of a statement nor any other mathematical entity can be given as the final result of an infinite process, since an infinite process is precisely one that does not have a final result.
	From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism (2nd ed) [2000], p.41), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 7.3
	A reaction: This is rather a persuasive reason to sympathise with intuitionism. Mathematical tricks about 'limits' have lured us into believing in completed infinities, but actually that idea is incoherent.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

7634	Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
	Full Idea: For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
	From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
	A reaction: Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).