14 ideas
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
| 14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
| Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims. | |
| From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct. |
| 14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
| Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect. | |
| From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4) | |
| A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area. |
| 14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
| Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities. | |
| From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4) | |
| A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly). |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
| A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |