Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'Gdel's Proof'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality

9591	The human intellect has not been, and cannot be, fully formalized [Nagel/Newman]
	Full Idea: The resources of the human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formalized.
	From: E Nagel / JR Newman (Gödel's Proof [1958], VIII)
	A reaction: This conclusion derives from Gödel's Theorem. Some people (e.g. Penrose) get over-excited by this discovery, and conclude that the human mind is supernatural. Imagination is the key - it is a feature of rationality that escapes mechanization.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

23366	We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
	A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion

4022	Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
	Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
	From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
	A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).

23365	If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
	A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.

25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish

23368	Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
	A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).