Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Right' and 'Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed)'

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
     Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'.
     From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9)
     A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: Hegel says we are only truly free, and so bearers of rights, in so far as we claim our freedom. ...So there are no merely natural rights, and animal's have no rights.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.78) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights'
     A reaction: If there are no natural rights, then it is hard to see how claiming a right will create it. I can't create a right to drink the best champagne. It seems particularly unjust to deny rights to people so enslaved that freedom has never occurred to them.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Selecting representatives on the basis of geography means selecting people without any regard to whether they represent the basic and important interests of the 'whole' of society.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Proportional representation seems to get away from this, but that can still be arranged according to large regions. Some means is needed to prevent the whole nation from exploitation a regional minority (such as Welsh speakers).
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel]
     Full Idea: The absolute right is the right to have rights.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.127), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights'
     A reaction: What a beautifully succinct and important idea! Does a foetus, or a dog, or a person in a vegetative state, or a slave, qualify?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).