8978
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Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
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A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
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12735
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Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
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A reaction:
This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'.
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6973
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Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
All moral theories, intuitionist, naturalistic, objectivist, emotive, and the rest, in so far as they are philosophical theories, are neutral as regards actual conduct; they belong to the field of meta-ethics, not ethics proper.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949])
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A reaction:
Interestingly, Ayer doesn't seem willing to accept 'ethics proper' as being 'philosophical'. Given the modern rise of applied ethics, it seems suprising to say that even normative ethics is not philosophical. Utilitarianism seems not to be philosophical.
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6970
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Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
To say, as I once did, that moral judgements are merely expressive of certain feelings is an oversimplification; ..moral attitudes consist in certain patterns of behaviour, and the expression of a judgement is an element in the pattern.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.238)
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A reaction:
This seems to switch from emotivism to what Frank Jackson calls 'moral functionalism', where morality is what gets us from certain emotional responses to willed actions. This strikes me, like most functional explanations, as wrong.
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10364
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Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
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A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
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