8978
|
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
|
|
A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
|
16569
|
The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
If you find it strange that in explaining these elements I do not use the qualities called Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry - as the philosophers do - I shall say to you that these qualities themselves seem to me to need explanation.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (The World [1631], 9:25-6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 1.3
|
|
A reaction:
Nice. I take pushing the boundaries of explanation back (or down) to be the basic driving force of all human thought, in metaphysics as well as in physics.
|
10364
|
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
|
|
A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
|