|
8978
|
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
|
|
A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
|
|
17302
|
Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
The logical principles about grounding include irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, and so forth.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.8)
|
|
A reaction:
[It can't ground itself, there is no mutual grounding, grounds of grounds ground, and grounding judgements are not fixed]
|
|
17292
|
Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
We should not use 'in virtue of' where it might express a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is irreflexive and asymmetric.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
|
|
A reaction:
E.g. he says someone isn't a bachelor in virtue of being an unmarried man, since a bachelor just is an unmarried man. I can't disagree. 'Determination' looks like the magic word, even if we don't know how it cashes out.
|
|
17294
|
Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
|
|
A reaction:
He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry.
|
|
17300
|
If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4)
|
|
A reaction:
It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding.
|
|
17301
|
Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
I deny that when p grounds q, q thereby reduces to p, and I deny that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q. ...On my view, reduction is nothing other than identity, so p is the same fact as q.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.5)
|
|
A reaction:
Very good. I can't disagree with any of it, and it is crystal clear. Philosophical heaven.
|
|
17299
|
There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological.
|
|
From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
|
|
A reaction:
Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding.
|
|
10364
|
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
|
|
Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
|
|
From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
|
|
A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
|