Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Parthood and Identity across Time' and 'Manuscript remains'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy

21916	Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: No one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophizes is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], II p.241-3), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
	A reaction: This is a direct reply to the opposite view expressed by Schleiermacher (and quoted by Lewis). I would say that to be a philosopher one must give priority to the philosophy, ahead of any religious beliefs. Thinking must be free.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

13267	Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Thomson famously objects that the doctrine of temporal parts is 'a crazy metaphysic - obviously false', since it entails that material objects are constantly being generated ex nihilo (or, at least, the stuff of which they are composed is).
	From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (Parthood and Identity across Time [1983], p.210) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 2.2
	A reaction: The related objections are to ask what the temporal 'width' of a part is, and whether the joins are visible.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

21924	As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: As the subject of willing I am an exceedingly wretched being, and all our suffering consistd in willing, ...but as soon as I am absorbed in knowledge, I am blissfully happy and nothing can assail me.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.137), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
	A reaction: So the source of his pessimism is subjection to his own will. However, since becoming absorbed in knowledge is an easy task for a scholar, he has little to grumble about. Nietzsche mocked the great pessimist for playing the flute every day.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

21915	To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
	A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts).

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).