Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Neutral Relations' and 'On Perceptions'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

14217	The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The 'standard' view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, is that we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order (which works for examples like 'loves' and 'between').
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
	A reaction: The point of Fine's paper is that there are many relations for which this model seems to fail.

14216	The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved']
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
	A reaction: Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places.

14218	A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata?
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
	A reaction: He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation.

14219	Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Roads in the directional sense (A-to-B or B-to-A) are merely roads in the adirectional sense up which a direction has been imposed.
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
	A reaction: This is Fine's linguistic objection to the standard view of relations. It is undeniable that language imposes an order where it may not exist ('Bob and Jane play tennis'), and this fact is very significant in discussing relations.

14220	Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: A 'biased' relation can be taken to be the result of imposing ordering on the argument-places of an unbiased relation, ..or we can take an unbiased relation to be a 'permutation class' of biased relations. This is a familiar metaphysic predicament.
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 3)
	A reaction: 'Biased' relations such as 'on top of' have an ordering to their places, but 'unbiased' relations such as 'vertical placement' do not. This is a nice question in the metaphysics of grounding relations between key concepts.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

12739	If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction

12738	Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: He who can finally make predictions with success must be said to have become sufficiently proficient in nature.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Is prediction achieved by knowledge of laws, or knowledge of essences and powers? The trouble with most laws is that they permit exceptions. 'Things fall, unless prevented' etc.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).