Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'The General Theory of Employment' and 'What is Knowledge-First Epistemology?'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

19540	Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
	Full Idea: Much theorizing about justification conflates issues of justified belief with issues of justified/blameless believers.
	From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.12)
	A reaction: [They cite Kent Bach 1985] Presumably the only thing that really justifies a belief is the truth, or the actual facts. You could then say 'p is a justified belief, though no one actually believes it'. E.g. the number of stars is odd.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification

19539	If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
	Full Idea: If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right.
	From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11)
	A reaction: [They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

19538	Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
	Full Idea: Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion. 'Cat' entails 'mammal' because the cats are a subset of the mammals.
	From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.10)
	A reaction: I would have thought that this was only one type of entailment. 'Travelling to Iceland entails flying'. Travelling includes flying, the reverse of cats/mammals, to a very complex set-theoretic account is needed. Interesting.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism

22601	Laissez-faire individualism doesn't work, especially in troublesome times [Keynes]
	Full Idea: It is obvious that an individualist society left to itself does not work well or even tolerably. The more troublesome the times, the worse does a laissez-faire system work.
	From: Maynard Keynes (The General Theory of Employment [1936]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
	A reaction: I thought I was a Communitarian, but I may be a Keynesian Liberal, committed to a safety net welfare system. I haven't quite decided yet. Political philosophy is hopeless, if the ideas actually have to be implemented. What is the criterion of 'work'?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).