21 ideas
6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Many axioms have been proposed, not on the grounds that they can be directly known, but rather because they produce a desired body of previously recognised results. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.5.1) | |
A reaction: This is the perennial problem with axioms - whether we start from them, or whether we deduce them after the event. There is nothing wrong with that, just as we might infer the existence of quarks because of their results. |
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
Full Idea: There are some proposals for non-well-founded set theory (tolerating cases of self-membership and membership circularities). | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Aczel 1988, and Barwise and Moss 1996] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is common in mereology to hold that there is something of which everything is part, but few hold that there is a 'null entity' that is part of everything. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This comes out as roughly the opposite of set theory, which cannot do without the null set, but is not keen on the set of everything. |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
Full Idea: While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract. |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is an open question whether there are any mereological atoms (with no proper parts), and also whether every object is ultimately made up of atoms. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3) | |
A reaction: Such a view would have to presuppose (metaphysically) that the divisibility of matter has limits. If one follows this route, then are there only 'natural' wholes, or are we 'unrestricted' in our view of how the atoms combine? I favour the natural route. |
6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Mathematical realism is the doctrine that mathematical objects exist, that much contemporary mathematics is true, and that the existence and truth in question is independent of our constructions, beliefs and proofs. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.12.9) | |
A reaction: As thus defined, I would call myself a mathematical realist, but everyone must hesitate a little at the word 'exist' and ask, how does it exist? What is it 'made of'? To say that it exists in the way that patterns exist strikes me as very helpful. |
6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
Full Idea: In maths the primary subject-matter is not mathematical objects but structures in which they are arranged; our constants and quantifiers denote atoms, structureless points, or positions in structures; they have no identity outside a structure or pattern. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very promising idea for the understanding of mathematics. All mathematicians acknowledge that the recognition of patterns is basic to the subject. Even animals recognise patterns. It is natural to invent a language of patterns. |
6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
Full Idea: On my view, sets are positions in certain patterns. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.5) | |
A reaction: I have always found the ontology of a 'set' puzzling, because they seem to depend on prior reasons why something is a member of a given set, which cannot always be random. It is hard to explain sets without mentioning properties. |
6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
Full Idea: If we take mathematics at its word, there are too many mathematical objects for it to be plausible that they are all mental or physical objects. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
A reaction: No one, of course, has ever claimed that they are, but this is a good starting point for assessing the ontology of mathematics. We are going to need 'rules', which can deduce the multitudinous mathematical objects from a small ontology. |
6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
Full Idea: I argue that mathematical knowledge has its roots in pattern recognition and representation, and that manipulating representations of patterns provides the connection between the mathematical proof and mathematical truth. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
A reaction: The suggestion that patterns are at the basis of the ontology of mathematics is the most illuminating thought I have encountered in the area. It immediately opens up the possibility of maths being an entirely empirical subject. |
6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Of the equivalence relationships which occur between patterns, congruence is the strongest, equivalence the next, and mutual occurrence the weakest. None of these is identity, which would require the same position. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.3) | |
A reaction: This gives some indication of how an account of mathematics as a science of patterns might be built up. Presumably the recognition of these 'degrees of strength' cannot be straightforward observation, but will need an a priori component? |
6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
Full Idea: An objection is that structuralism fails to explain why certain mathematical patterns are unified wholes while others are not; for instance, some think that an ontological account of mathematics must explain why a triangle is not a 'random' set of points. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.4) | |
A reaction: This is an indication that we are not just saying that we recognise patterns in nature, but that we also 'see' various underlying characteristics of the patterns. The obvious suggestion is that we see meta-patterns. |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
Full Idea: The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'. |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
Full Idea: With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
Full Idea: The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1) |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651. |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
Full Idea: Taking reflexivity as constitutive of the meaning of 'part' amounts to regarding identity as a limit case of parthood. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: A nice thought, but it is horribly 'philosophical', and a long way from ordinary usage and common sense (which is, I'm sorry to say, a BAD thing). |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
Full Idea: We might say that sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity, as some entities may differ exclusively with respect to the arrangement of the parts, as when we compare 'John loves Mary' with 'Mary loves John'. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably wide dispersal should also prevent parts from fixing wholes, but there is so much vagueness here that it is tempting to go for unrestricted composition, and then work back to the common sense position. |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
Full Idea: Conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Very nice. People who cite 'conceivability' in this context often have a disgracefully loose usage for the word. Really, really conceivable is probably our only guide to possibility. |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |