Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Adverbial Theory' and 'Zettel'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
2626 A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas; that is what makes him a philosopher.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], 455)
     A reaction: A bit surprising from the man who gave us 'language games' and 'private language argument'.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6569 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: According to Wittgenstein, 'this sentence is false' sends us off on an endless, looping search for the proposition to be evaluated.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], §691) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2
     A reaction: Fogelin quotes this as one possible strategy for dealing with the Liar Paradox. It doesn't sound like much of a solution to the paradox, merely an account of why it is so annoying. Wittgenstein's challenge is that the Cretan can't state his problem.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
2713 Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye]
     Full Idea: Can sense-data exist unsensed? Can two persons experience numerically identical sense-data? Do sense-data have surfaces which are not sensed? What are sense-data made of? Are they located?
     From: Michael Tye (Adverbial Theory [1995], p.7)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3790 Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to the question of what we believe.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], i.437)
     A reaction: This should have nipped the causal theory of knowledge in the bud before it got started. Everyone has a different cause for their belief that 'it sometimes rains'. Cause is not justification.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).