Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism' and 'Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Chihara proposes to replace all sets by reference to the open sentences that define them.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle [1973]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4
     A reaction: This depends on predicativism, because that stipulates the definitions will be available (cos if it ain't definable it ain't there). Chihara went on to define the open sentences in terms of the possibility of uttering them. Cf. propositional functions.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Art leads to mental health, and mental clarity [Beardsley,M, by Carroll,N]
     Full Idea: Beardsley says aesthetic experience relieves tensions and quiet destructive emotions. It also aids us in sorting out the jumble in the flow of consciousness, by virtue of its tendencies toward heightened clarity and coherence.
     From: report of Monroe Beardsley (Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism [1958]) by Noël Carroll - Monroe Beardsley p.162-3
     A reaction: I find this claim highly implausible. I like art, but I feel neither healthier nor clearer after experiencing it.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).