Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Teplitz Fragments' and 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity''

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7 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

19590	Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
	Full Idea: An empiricist is one whose way of thinking is an effect of the external world and of fate - the passive thinker - to whom his philosophy is given.
	From: Novalis (Teplitz Fragments [1798], 33)
	A reaction: Novalis goes on to enthuse about 'magical idealism', so he rejects empiricism. This is an early attack on the Myth of the Given, found in Sellars and McDowell.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

5503	Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.

5504	Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

5502	Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
	A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

5505	For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
	A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.