Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' and 'Two Problems of Epistemology'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect

22465	We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.

22466	We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.

22467	Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
	Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
	A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism

22470	A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
	Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
	A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue

22468	Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
	Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

22469	Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
	Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).