Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Letters to Regius' and 'Locke on Human Understanding'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

7720	Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
	Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

7712	On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4)
	A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

12251	Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Clearly no explanation can be given by these substantial forms for any natural action, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves, ...so they explain nothing.
	From: René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], 1642.01), quoted by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 267 n5
	A reaction: [Oderberg gives refs for attack by Locke and Hume, p.66] Descartes' target is Aristotle's hylomorphism. The problem seems to be understanding what Aristotle meant, which is much more than mere 'shape'. More like 'controlling principle'.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7710	Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
	Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception

7711	Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
	A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self

7714	Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
	Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

7715	Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
	Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental

7722	If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
	Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels

16772	An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Descartes points out that an angelic mind, even if causally connected to a human body, would not experience the same sort of bodily sensations; it would, instead, simply observe flesh being torn, like a piece of paper.
	From: report of René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], III:493) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
	A reaction: Does that mean that the angel could not have the experience even if it wanted to have it. So they can't pick up a cup either? So they can't make themselves known to us, even if they are desperate to? So the Annunciation never happened?