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8978
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Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
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A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
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12251
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Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Clearly no explanation can be given by these substantial forms for any natural action, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves, ...so they explain nothing.
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From:
René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], 1642.01), quoted by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 267 n5
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A reaction:
[Oderberg gives refs for attack by Locke and Hume, p.66] Descartes' target is Aristotle's hylomorphism. The problem seems to be understanding what Aristotle meant, which is much more than mere 'shape'. More like 'controlling principle'.
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10364
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Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
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A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
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16772
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An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau]
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Full Idea:
Descartes points out that an angelic mind, even if causally connected to a human body, would not experience the same sort of bodily sensations; it would, instead, simply observe flesh being torn, like a piece of paper.
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From:
report of René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], III:493) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
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A reaction:
Does that mean that the angel could not have the experience even if it wanted to have it. So they can't pick up a cup either? So they can't make themselves known to us, even if they are desperate to? So the Annunciation never happened?
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