8748
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Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
The logical positivists brought geometry into the fold of logicism. The axioms of, say, Euclidean geometry are simply definitions of primitive terms like 'point' and 'line'.
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From:
report of Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3
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A reaction:
If the concept of 'line' is actually created by its definition, then we need to know exactly what (say) 'shortest' means. If we are merely describing a line, then our definition can be 'impredicative', using other accepted concepts.
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8978
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Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
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A reaction:
Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
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13933
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Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
We distinguish two kinds of existence questions: first, entities of a new kind within the framework; we call them 'internal questions'. Second, 'external questions', concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2)
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A reaction:
This nicely disposes of many ontological difficulties, but at the price of labelling most external questions as meaningless, so that the internal answers have very little commitment, and the external (big) questions are now banned. Not for me.
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13935
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We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2)
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A reaction:
If you derive your metaphysics from your language, then objects are linguistic conventions. But why do we accept conventions about objects?
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16638
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The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
Whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.2.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2
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A reaction:
This seems to count as a sense-datum theory, rather than a representative theory of perception, since it makes no commitment to the qualities containing any accurate information at all. We just start from the qualities and try to work it out.
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13932
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Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions etc. They usually feel more sympathy with nominalists than with realists (in the medieval sense).
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 1)
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A reaction:
The obvious reason is that you can't have sense experiences of abstract entities. I like the question 'what are they made of?' rather than the question 'how can I experience them?'.
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16688
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Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
All evidence is conception, as it is said, and all conception is imagination and proceeds from sense. And spirits we suppose to be those substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.11.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2
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A reaction:
This is exactly the same as Hume's claim that all ideas are the result of impressions, and is the very essence of empiricism. We see here that such an epistemology can have huge consequences.
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13937
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New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
The acceptance of new linguistic forms about entities cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 3)
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A reaction:
The obvious problem seems to be that a complete pack of lies might be successful for a very long time, if it plugged a critical hole in a major theory. Is success judged financially? How do we judge success without mentioning truth?
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7410
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Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck]
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Full Idea:
If men are their own judges of what conduces to their preservation, ..all men make different decisions about what counts as a danger, so (for Hobbes) the grimmest version of ethical relativism seems to be the only possible ethical vision.
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From:
report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
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A reaction:
This might depend on self-preservation being the only fundamental value. But if self-preservation is not a pressing issue, presumably other values might come into play, some of them less concerned with the individual's own interests.
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10364
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Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
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Full Idea:
Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
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From:
Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
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A reaction:
Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
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