12 ideas
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
| 472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8 |
| 21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito. |
| 21215 | The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3) | |
| A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation. |
| 473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b |
| 1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d |
| 469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |
| 476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 21219 | Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them. |
| 1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle. | |
| From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3 |