Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics without Principles', 'Essential vs Accidental Properties' and 'First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Second-order logic raises doubts because of its ontological commitment to the set-theoretic hierarchy, and the allegedly problematic epistemic status of the second-order consequence relation.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §1)
     A reaction: The 'epistemic' problem is whether you can know the truths, given that the logic is incomplete, and so they cannot all be proved. Rossberg defends second-order logic against the second problem. A third problem is that it may be mathematics.
Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Henkin semantics (for second-order logic) specifies a second domain of predicates and relations for the upper case constants and variables.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This second domain is restricted to predicates and relations which are actually instantiated in the model. Second-order logic is complete with this semantics. Cf. Idea 10756.
There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: In addition to standard and Henkin semantics for second-order logic, one might also employ substitutional or game-theoretical or topological semantics, or Boolos's plural interpretation, or even a semantics inspired by Lesniewski.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This is helpful in seeing the full picture of what is going on in these logical systems.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Logical consequence is intuitively taken to be a semantic notion, ...and it is therefore the formal semantics, i.e. the model theory, that captures logical consequence.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: If you come at the issue from normal speech, this seems right, but if you start thinking about the necessity of logical consequence, that formal rules and proof-theory seem to be the foundation.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Deductive consequence, written Γ|-S, is loosely read as 'the sentence S can be deduced from the sentences Γ', and semantic consequence Γ|=S says 'all models that make Γ true make S true as well'.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: We might read |= as 'true in the same model as'. What is the relation, though, between the LHS and the RHS? They seem to be mutually related to some model, but not directly to one another.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A proof-theorist could insist that the logical form of a sentence is exhibited by the logical constants that it contains.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: You have to first get to the formal logical constants, rather than the natural language ones. E.g. what is the truth table for 'but'? There is also the matter of the quantifiers and the domain, and distinguishing real objects and predicates from bogus.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A standard model is a set of objects called the 'domain', and an interpretation function, assigning objects in the domain to names, subsets to predicate letters, subsets of the Cartesian product of the domain with itself to binary relation symbols etc.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: The model actually specifies which objects have which predicates, and which objects are in which relations. Tarski's account of truth in terms of 'satisfaction' seems to be just a description of those pre-decided facts.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A mathematical theory is 'categorical' if, and only if, all of its models are isomorphic. Such a theory then essentially has just one model, the standard one.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: So the term 'categorical' is gradually replacing the much-used phrase 'up to isomorphism'.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: All that should be required to get a semantics relative to which a given deductive system is complete is a sufficiently cunning model-theorist.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §5)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: No deductive system is semantically incomplete in and of itself; rather a deductive system is incomplete with respect to a specified formal semantics.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This important point indicates that a system might be complete with one semantics and incomplete with another. E.g. second-order logic can be made complete by employing a 'Henkin semantics'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
     Full Idea: It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])
     A reaction: Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
     Full Idea: An 'individual essence' is a property that in addition to being essential is also unique to the object, in the sense that it is not possible that something distinct from that object possesses that property.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §5)
     A reaction: She cites a 'haecceity' (or mere bare identity) as a trivial example of an individual essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
     Full Idea: According to 'sortal essentialism', an object could not have been of a radically different kind than it in fact is.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §4)
     A reaction: This strikes me as thoroughly wrong. Things belong in kinds because of their properties. Could you remove all the contingent features of a tiger, leaving it as merely 'a tiger', despite being totally unrecognisable?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
     Full Idea: It is easy to confuse the notion of an essential property that a thing could not lack, with a property it could not lose. My having spent Christmas 2007 in Tennessee is a non-essential property I could not lose.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: The idea that having spent Christmas in Tennessee is a property I find quite bewildering. Is my not having spent my Christmas in Tennessee one of my properties? I suspect that real unlosable properties are essential ones.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
     Full Idea: The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: [She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
     Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
     Full Idea: Dancy distinguishes three parts of the supervenience base of values: 1) those which ground the value ('resultance base'); 2) those which enable the ground to make something good ('enabling conditions'); 3) those which intensify or diminish value.
     From: report of Jonathan Dancy (Ethics without Principles [2004], p. 170-181) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 5.2
     A reaction: I really like and admire this. Dancy has focused on what really matters about values (and hence about the whole of ethics), and begun the work of getting a bit of clarity and increased understanding.