Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics without Principles', 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' and 'Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12185	Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
	Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.
	From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1
	A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

14288	'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: According to Jackson, in asserting 'If A,B' the speaker expresses his belief that A⊃B, and also indicates that this belief is 'robust' with respect to the antecedent A - the speaker would not abandon A⊃B if he were to learn that A.
	From: report of Frank Jackson (On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals [1979]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2
	A reaction: The point is that you must not believe A⊃B solely on the dubious grounds of ¬A. This is 'to ensure an assertable conditional is fit for modus ponens' - that is, that you really will affirm B when you learn that A is true. Nice idea.

13769	Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: Jackson holds that conditionals are truth-functional, but are governed by rules of assertability, rather like 'but' compared to 'and'. The belief must be 'robust' - the speaker would not abandon his belief that A⊃B if he were to learn that A.
	From: report of Frank Jackson (On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals [1979]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.3.2
	A reaction: This seems to spell out more precisely the pragmatic approach to conditionals pioneered by Grice, in Idea 13767. The idea is make conditionals 'fit for modus ponens'. They mustn't just be based on a belief that ¬A.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value

18681	The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
	Full Idea: Dancy distinguishes three parts of the supervenience base of values: 1) those which ground the value ('resultance base'); 2) those which enable the ground to make something good ('enabling conditions'); 3) those which intensify or diminish value.
	From: report of Jonathan Dancy (Ethics without Principles [2004], p. 170-181) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 5.2
	A reaction: I really like and admire this. Dancy has focused on what really matters about values (and hence about the whole of ethics), and begun the work of getting a bit of clarity and increased understanding.