Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics without Principles', 'Sentences' and 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism''

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7 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
     Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
     A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
     A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
     Full Idea: Dancy distinguishes three parts of the supervenience base of values: 1) those which ground the value ('resultance base'); 2) those which enable the ground to make something good ('enabling conditions'); 3) those which intensify or diminish value.
     From: report of Jonathan Dancy (Ethics without Principles [2004], p. 170-181) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 5.2
     A reaction: I really like and admire this. Dancy has focused on what really matters about values (and hence about the whole of ethics), and begun the work of getting a bit of clarity and increased understanding.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
     Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
     Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
     From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
     A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.