8 ideas
8714 | Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist can say that the sense in which '2+2=4' is true is pretty much the same as the sense in which 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true. They are true 'according to a well-known story', or 'according to standard mathematics'. | |
From: Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [1989], 1.1.1), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3 | |
A reaction: The roots of this idea are in Carnap. Fictionalism strikes me as brilliant, but poisonous in large doses. Novels can aspire to artistic truth, or to documentary truth. We invent a fiction, and nudge it slowly towards reality. |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It should not be said that as distinct words and intentions or concepts are distinct from one another, so too the corresponding things are distinct. Those distinctions do not always line up with distinctions among things that are signified. | |
From: William of Ockham (Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents [1320], 7.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the great nominalist opponent of the idea that Aristotle's ten categories give an accurate map of reality. He proposed just substance and accidents, and based categorisation on the questions we ask. |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt. |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment. |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
Full Idea: There are deep problems for utilitarianism in trying to work out what the ideal population size would be. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Four) |