Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'works' and 'Chapters on Scepticism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3568 Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A]
     Full Idea: Surely ALL truths are externally justified?
     From: Adam Cross (works [2001]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A very nice warning to aspiring externalists. If you actually think the justification is somehow 'out there', then everything is going to be justified, by its own facts. We need to get the justification 'in here'.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We can't say the school of Pyrrho is sceptical, because the motion of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible to others, so we don't know Pyrrho's disposition.
     From: report of Theodosius (Chapters on Scepticism [c.100 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8