Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value' and 'Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant]
     Full Idea: Considered objectively, there can only be one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can only be one true philosophy from principles, in however many conflicting ways men have philosophised about the same proposition.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Pref)
     A reaction: An idea that embodies the Enlightenment ideal. I like the idea that there is one true philosophy, because there is only one world. Kant is talking of philosophy 'from principles', which means his transendental idealism.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is (such as properties, meanings and numbers). I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], Intro)
     A reaction: I find that an enormously helpful distinction, and support the Aristotelian view. Schaffer's general line is that what exists is fairly uncontroversial and dull, but the interesting truths about the world emerge when we grasp its structure.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Traditional metaphysics is so tightly woven into the fabric of philosophy that it cannot be torn out without the whole tapestry unravelling.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3)
     A reaction: I often wonder why the opponents of metaphysics still continue to do philosophy. I don't see how you address questions of ethics, or philosophy of mathematics (etc) without coming up against highly general and abstract over-questions.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Occam's Razor should only be understood to concern substances: do not multiply basic entities without necessity. There is no problem with the multiplication of derivative entities - they are an 'ontological free lunch'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: The phrase 'ontological free lunch' comes from Armstrong. This is probably what Occam meant. A few extra specks of dust, or even a few more numbers (thank you, Cantor!) don't seem to challenge the principle.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: We can automatically infer 'there are roses' from 'there are red roses' (with no shift in the meaning of 'roses'). Likewise one can automatically infer 'there are numbers' from 'there are prime numbers'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: He similarly observes that the atheist's 'God is a fictional character' implies 'there are fictional characters'. Schaffer is not committing to a strong platonism with his claim - merely that the existence of numbers is hardly worth disputing.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Grounding should be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian approach. Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion - it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2)
     A reaction: [he cites K.Fine 1991] I find that this simple claim clarifies the discussions of Kit Fine, where you are not always quite sure what the game is. I agree fully with it. It makes metaphysics interesting, where cataloguing entities is boring.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is mere modal correlation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: My preferred view is that there is only one fundamental entity - the whole concrete cosmos - from which all else exists by abstraction.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: This looks to me like weak anti-realism - that there are no natural 'joints' in nature - but I don't think Schaffer intends that. I take the joints to be fundamentals, which necessitates that the cosmos has parts. His 'abstraction' is clearly a process.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Maybe the categories are determined by the different grounding relations, ..so that categories just are the ways things depend on substances. ...Categories are places in the dependence ordering.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 1.3)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11)
     A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction.
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: One motivation for dialetheism is the view that there are impossible worlds.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: A 'Moorean certainty' is when something is more credible than any philosopher's argument to the contrary.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: The reference is to G.E. Moore's famous claim that the existence of his hand is more certain than standard sceptical arguments. It sounds empiricist, but they might be parallel rational truths, of basic logic or arithmetic.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant]
     Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E)
     A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless?
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality')
     A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends.
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')
     A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: 'Subjectivism' identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. ...'Objectivism' says that something is good as an end if a property, intrinsic goodness, is attributed to it.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')
     A reaction: Not sure about 'objectivism' here, as attributing a 'property'. A tomato is not intrinsically good. Hopeless for building walls.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: It is because contemplation is an activity that is not also a process that Aristotle identifies it as the most final good.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Activity')
     A reaction: Quite a helpful way of labelling what Aristotle has in mind. So should we not aspire to be involved in processes, except reluctantly? I take the mind itself to be a process, so that may be difficult!
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: Contemplation, as Aristotle understand it, is not research or inquiry, but an activity that ensues on these: an activity that consists in understanding.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Aristotle')
     A reaction: Fairly obvious, when you read the last part of 'Ethics', but helpful in grasping Aristotle, because understanding is the objective of 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Metaphysics', so he tells you how to achieve the ideal moral state.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
     Full Idea: The state of nature need not be a state of injustice merely because those who live in it treat one another in terms of power. But it is devoid of justice, for if a dispute over right occurs in it, there is no competent judge to give valid decisions.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §44)
     A reaction: Could you not achieve justice by means of personal violence? Might not a revered older person have been accepted as a judge?
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant]
     Full Idea: A monarch has the highest power, while an autocrat or absolute ruler is one who has all the power.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §51)
     A reaction: If society is strictly hierarchical (like an army) then the monarch also has all the power. At the other extreme the one holding the highest power may have very little power, because so many others have their share of the power.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant]
     Full Idea: A hereditary nobility is a distinction bestowed before it is earned, and since it gives no ground for hoping that it will be earned, it is wholly unreal and fanciful.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen D)
     A reaction: As the controller of the region of a country, a hereditary noble is the embodiment of a ruling family, which is a well established way of running things. Daft, perhaps, but there are probably worse ways of doing it. Single combat, for example.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant]
     Full Idea: Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro C)
     A reaction: This idea shows the moral basis for Kant's liberalism in politics. If all individuals acted without contact or reference to other individuals (a race of hermits) then that would appear to be optimum moral right, by this standard.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women have no role in politics [Kant]
     Full Idea: Women in general …have no civil personality.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §46)
     A reaction: In case you were wondering. This is five years after Mary Wollstonecraft's book.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant]
     Full Idea: Our innate equality is independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Div B)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to capture the whole concept. The two of us may be unequally oppressed by a third. We are unequal with the third, but also with one another, though with no binding relationships.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant]
     Full Idea: By the original contract all members of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonweath.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §47)
     A reaction: This tries to give the impression that absolutely nothing is lost in the original alienation of rights. It is probably better to say that you give up one set of freedoms, which are replaced by a different (and presumably superior) set.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant]
     Full Idea: Whatever someone has himself substantially made is his own undisputed property.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §55)
     A reaction: To this extent Kant offers clear agreement with Locke about a self-evident property right. Ownership of land is the controversial bit.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Human life is pointless without justice [Kant]
     Full Idea: If justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E)
     A reaction: I suspect that human life is also pointless if it only involves justice, and nothing else worthwhile. Are there other things so good that we might sacrifice justice to achieve them? How about maximal utilitarian happiness?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant]
     Full Idea: All murderers …must suffer the death penalty. This is what justice, as the idea of judicial power, wills in accordance with universal laws of a priori origin.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E)
     A reaction: Illustration of how giving a principle an a priori origin puts it beyond dispute. Kant is adamant that mercy mustn't interfere with the enactment of justice. And Kant obviously rejects any consequentialist approach. Remind me what is wrong with murder?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant]
     Full Idea: The church [as opposed to religion] fulfils a genuine political necessity, for it enables the people to regard themselves as subjects of an invisible supreme power to which they must pay homage.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen C)
     A reaction: I'm sure I remember Marx putting a different spin on this point… This idea captures the conservative attitude to established religion, at least in the UK.